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University, Durham, UK, 3 Center for Lifespan Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany,
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The brain’s resting-state has attracted considerable interest in recent years, but
currently little is known either about typical experience during the resting-state or
about whether there are inter-individual differences in resting-state phenomenology.
We used descriptive experience sampling (DES) in an attempt to apprehend high
fidelity glimpses of the inner experience of five participants in an extended fMRI study.
Results showed that the inner experiences and the neural activation patterns (as
quantified by amplitude of low frequency fluctuations analysis) of the five participants
were largely consistent across time, suggesting that our extended-duration scanner
sessions were broadly similar to typical resting-state sessions. However, there were very
large individual differences in inner phenomena, suggesting that the resting-state itself
may differ substantially from one participant to the next. We describe these individual
differences in experiential characteristics and display some typical moments of resting-
state experience. We also show that retrospective characterizations of phenomena can
often be very different from moment-by-moment reports. We discuss implications for
the assessment of inner experience in neuroimaging studies more generally, concluding
that it may be possible to use fMRI to investigate neural correlates of phenomena
apprehended in high fidelity.
Keywords: resting state, descriptive experience sampling (DES), fMRI, default mode network (DMN), Resting
State Questionnaire (ReSQ), mind wandering
Introduction
In resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging (rfMRI), spontaneous changes in the blood
oxygen dependent (BOLD) signal can be used to study networks of brain areas that are functionally
connected and tend to co-activate when a participant is not performing any explicit task, that is,
when a participant is in what is often referred to as the “resting state.” These studies produce activity
in a consistent network of brain regions, including lower precuneus, superior and inferior anterior
medial frontal regions, and posterior lateral parietal cortices (Gusnard and Raichle, 2001). Initially,
these regions were identiﬁed because they were found to be consistently deactivated when tasks are
performed. The consistency with which this set of brain regions decrease in activity during tasks
and increase during ﬁxation or resting has led to the notion of a so-called “default mode” network
of the brain (Buckner et al., 2008).
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Scientists interested in rfMRI have provided a wide variety
of characterizations of the kinds of experiences and processes
that are ongoing when default-mode brain regions are active, as
exempliﬁed in Table 1. As those characterizations demonstrate,
there is wide variability in the descriptions of phenomena
in the resting state. Researchers are increasingly sensitive
to the potential phenomenological heterogeneity of subjective
experience in the resting state (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015),
denoted here as ‘mind wandering’ in accord with popular usage
(Callard et al., 2013). For example, Gorgolewski et al. (2014)
demonstrated relations between the content and form of self-
generated thoughts in the resting state (such as imagery and
future-related thinking) and speciﬁc intrinsic neural activity
patterns. Ruby et al. (2013) showed that the relation between
the emotional content of thoughts and subsequent mood was
modulated by the socio-temporal content of the thoughts,
speciﬁcally their relatedness to the past. At the same time, there
is a growing recognition that psychological experiences collected
under the umbrella of mind wandering are not necessarily the
experiential manifestation of neural activity in the resting state,
and that the relation between experiential phenomena and neural
state is complex (Raichle, 2011; Fox and Christoﬀ, 2014).
Most characterizations of mind wandering as the
psychological counterpart of the brain’s resting state follow
from indirect theoretical considerations (researchers set
tasks for participants in the scanner and then theorize about
what is not ongoing in those tasks; Callard and Margulies,
2014) or retrospective characterizations. Researchers have
recently developed three questionnaires that ask participants
retrospectively to characterize their resting state cognition: the
Resting State Questionnaire (ReSQ; Delamillieure et al., 2010),
the Amsterdam Resting State Questionnaire (ARSQ; Diaz et al.,
2013, and its revised and extended counterpart the ARSQ 2.0
Diaz et al., 2014), and the New York Cognition Questionnaire
(NYC-Q; Gorgolewski et al., 2014). These questionnaires
typically ask volunteers to participate in an fMRI resting-state
session (or online analog thereof; Diaz et al., 2014), exit the
scanner, and then immediately characterize their in-scanner
resting state experience. The ReSQ asks participants to use
visual-analog scales to estimate the proportion of their resting-
state time that they had been engaged in visual imagery, in
inner language, in somatosensory awareness, in inner musical
experience, and in the mental manipulation of numbers. The
ARSQ 2.0 uses 30 Likert-scale items divided into ten factors
(discontinuity of mind, theory of mind, self, planning, sleepiness,
comfort, somatic awareness, health concern, visual thought,
and verbal thought). The NYC-Q asks participants to report
on the content and form of their self-generated thoughts using
Likert scales. Factor analysis of the NYC-Q has revealed ﬁve
main content factors of resting-state experiences: past, future,
positive, negative, and social experiences, and three main form
factors: words, images, and thought speciﬁcity. All three of these
questionnaires ask respondents to characterize their resting
state in general and therefore do not characterize particular
moments. However, Hurlburt and Heavey (2015) argued that
retrospective questionnaires may not be adequate to characterize
moments of inner experience. They held that retrospective
reports about inner experience are perhaps more inﬂuenced
by the participant’s presuppositions about experience than
by the participant’s experience itself, that retrospections are
skewed by reporting biases such as recency or salience, and
so on.
There have been a few studies that have sought to overcome
the retrospectiveness limitations by using experience sampling
to examine experiences at speciﬁc moments during the resting
state. For example, Christoﬀ et al. (2009) had subjects in an
fMRI scanner perform a boring go/no-go task and intermittently
presented thought probes. Each probe asked participants to
report on their mental state using two Likert scales: one asked
whether attention was focused on the task (rated from completely
TABLE 1 | Characterizations of experiences when the default mode is active.
Characterization Source
1 “unconstrained verbally mediated thoughts” Shulman et al., 1997, p. 648
2 “semantic knowledge retrieval, representation in awareness, and directed manipulation of represented knowledge for
organization, problem-solving, and planning”
Binder et al., 1999, p. 80
3 “active retrieval of past experiences and planning of future experiences” Andreasen et al., 1995, p. 1576
4 “retrieval and manipulation of past events, both personal and general, in an effort to solve problems and develop future
plans”
Greicius et al., 2003, p. 257
5 “enhanced watchfulness toward the external environment (e.g., waiting for upcoming task-relevant stimuli or attending to
scanner noise and incidental light)”
Gilbert et al., 2007, p. 43
6 “inner thought, self-reflective thinking in terms of planning for the future, or simulation of behavior. . . interrupted. . . into a. . .
extrospective. . . state of mind. . . characterized. . . as increased attention and readiness,. . . sensorimotor planning for future
routes of action in response to potential changes in the inner and outer environment”
Fransson, 2005, p. 26
7 “not focused on the external environment,. . . internally focused tasks including autobiographical memory retrieval,
envisioning the future, and conceiving the perspectives of others”
Buckner et al., 2008, p. 1
8 “spontaneous, internally directed cognitive processes” Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010, p. 322
9 “spontaneous mental contents which are unrelated to perception and coordinate[d]. . . so that they are maintained in the
face of competing sensory information”
Smallwood et al., 2012, p. 67
10 “an ultimate state of inspection of the self” Wicker et al., 2003, p. 229
11 “stable, unified perspective of the organism relative to its environment (a ‘self ’)” Gusnard and Raichle, 2001, p. 692
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on task to completely oﬀ task); the second asked whether the
subject was aware of where their attention was focused (rated
from completely aware to completely unaware). However, such
studies have focused on rating one or two aspects of experience
and have not tried to provide descriptions of actual ongoing
experience.
Thus there are to date no investigations that have sought
to provide high ﬁdelity descriptions of the phenomena that
are ongoing in the resting state. Understanding the experiential
details of the resting state is important because the resting state
is typically the baseline against which the results of particular
tasks are compared, as well as being an important target of
investigation in its own right. Hurlburt and Heavey (2015)
suggested that descriptive experience sampling (DES; Hurlburt,
1990, 1993, 2011a; Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006; Hurlburt and
Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007) may be capable
of producing high ﬁdelity descriptions of experience. In its
typical application, DES uses a random beeper to interrupt
participants in their natural environments. Participants are to
attend to the experience that was ongoing at the moment of the
onset of the beep and to jot down notes about that experience.
A typical participant receives six such beeps in typically a 3-
h window. Later that day (or the next day), the participant
meets with the investigator in what DES calls an expositional
interview designed to discover the details of the six experiences
and “iteratively” to improve the quality of subsequent sampling.
The sample/interview procedure is then repeated over a number
(typically 4–6) of sampling days.
Descriptive experience sampling has been compared to and
contrasted with a variety of qualitative and related methods (see
Table 2). In broad strokes, DES diﬀers from other methods in
that DES aims at pristine inner experience (Hurlburt, 2011a),
experience that is directly apprehendable at a moment; its
view that people often do not know the characteristics of their
own experience unless trained to apprehend them, probably
requiring an iterative method (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011a); its
minimization of retrospection; and its methods of bracketing
of presuppositions (Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007, 2011;
Hurlburt, 2011a).
We have seen, then, that (a) it would be desirable to
understand the phenomenology of experience while in the
resting state in the scanner; and that (b) DES, with its iterative
training, may provide high ﬁdelity access to the phenomenology
of experience in a way that can be integrated with fMRI
(Kühn et al., 2014). The present study seeks to combine those
two considerations, a non-trivial exercise because the duration
of DES studies (typically measured in days) is far greater
than is typically available in the magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) resting state sessions (typically measured in minutes).
As illustrated in Figure 1, the present study attempted to
overcome that obstacle ﬁrst by preliminarily training participants
in DES in their natural environments prior to involvement
in the scanner and then by using DES in extended-duration
fMRI resting state sessions. The extended-duration resting-
state sessions involved nine 25-min fMRI sessions for each
participant (9 × 25 = 225 min of resting state per participant
instead of the more usual 5 or 10 min). Participants were
TABLE 2 | Comparing DES with qualitative and related methods.
Method Comparison reference
Kvales’ qualitative research interview Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006, Chap. 12
Giorgi’s phenomenological psychology Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006, Chap. 12
Stern’s micro-analytic interview Hurlburt, 2011a, Chap. 7
Vermersch’s explicitation interview Hurlburt, 2011b
Petitmengin’s second-person interview Hurlburt and Akhter, 2006
van Manen’s hermeneutic
phenomenological inquiry
Heavey et al., 2010
Moustakas’s human science research Heavey et al., 2010
Armchair introspection Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007,
Chap. 11; 2011
Eyewitness testimony Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007,
Chap. 11
Questionnaires Hurlburt and Heavey, 2015
Non-DES experience sampling
methods
Hurlburt and Heavey, 2015
given the same instructions as are usual in resting-state
studies.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Five native English-speaking (because RTH would be the
lead interviewer) participants who currently lived in Berlin
(because MRI scanning would take place at the Max Planck
Institut für Bildungsforschung) participated on the basis of
informed consent and with ethical committee approval according
to the Declaration of Helsinki. All participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision. No participant had a history
of neurological, major medical, or psychiatric disorder. The
participants (three females, two males) had a mean age of 22.4
(ranging from 18 to 30) and all but one (male) were right-
handed.
Measures
The ReSQ (Delamillieure et al., 2010) is a semi-structured
questionnaire that asks participants to characterize their inner
experiences when they had been resting quietly in a MRI
scanner.
Descriptive experience sampling was performed as described
in Hurlburt (2011a) and elsewhere. DES is primarily an
idiographic procedure, allowing and encouraging the
examination of phenomena that may be idiosyncratic to
particular individuals, but it has identiﬁed ﬁve phenomena that
are characteristic of many individuals, which we will call the
5FP (ﬁve frequent phenomena): inner speaking (the experience
of speaking to oneself in one’s own voice but without any
external sound or motor movement; Hurlburt et al., 2013);
inner seeing (experiencing imaginary seeing); unsymbolized
thinking (the directly apprehended experience of thinking
that is not accompanied by the apprehension of words, visual
images, or any other symbols; Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008a,b);
sensory awareness (experience where a particular focus is on
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FIGURE 1 | Procedure schematic for each participant.
a sensation, not for any instrumental utility; Hurlburt et al.,
2009); and feelings (the experience of emotion; Heavey et al.,
2012).
Other measures not relevant here were administered as part of
a larger study.
Procedure
A bird’s-eye view of the procedure for each participant is
illustrated in Figure 1. Each participant was scheduled for
19 sessions, generally across a 2-weeks period, which were
divided into four phases. Schedules were individualized for each
participant; for example, scanner sessions were generally twice a
day, but because of holiday or other pressures were occasionally
once or three times on some days. DES instructions were also
individualized; a tenet of DES is to be candid, and participants
with more questions got more initial instructions.
In the introduction/pre-DES resting state phase (Figure 1,
bottom left), we fully explained the study, administered initial
questionnaires not relevant to the present report, and familiarized
the participant with the MRI scanner and procedures. Then the
participant entered the scanner, where we conducted a structural
scan and then a 5-min resting state scan according to standard
procedures. The resting-state instructions were “please close your
eyes and relax, without falling asleep.” Immediately following the
resting-state scan, the participant exited the scanner and ﬁlled out
the ReSQ questionnaire under supervision of a psychologist.
In the natural-environment DES sampling phase (Figure 1,
middle left), which began typically immediately after the
completion of the ReSQ, we instructed the participant in the
use of the DES beeper and the sampling task (Hurlburt, 2011a;
Hurlburt et al., 2013): the participant was to wear the beeper
in the participant’s natural environment for ∼3 h, during which
the participant would hear (through an earphone) six randomly
occurring beeps. Immediately after each beep the participant
was to jot down notes (in a supplied small notebook) about the
ongoing inner experience—the experience that was “in ﬂight”
at the moment the beep sounded. Following the DES instructions,
the participant proceeded to the natural environment, wore
the DES beeper, and, when beeped, collected six experience
samples. Later that day or the next day the participant returned
for the ﬁrst DES expositional interview about those six beeped
experiences; this interview was conducted by RTH and at least
one and as many as four additional interviewers (the study
was part of a training program), usually including SK and
sometimes CF or BA-D. The expositional interview (following
the DES procedure) was “iterative” (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011a),
designed to increase, across sampling days, the participant’s skill
in apprehending and describing inner experience. Following
this interview, the participant returned to his or her everyday
environment and responded to six more random beeps, again
jotting notes about the ongoing experiences. The following day
the participant returned for a second expositional interview about
the second-sampling-day’s six beeped experiences. This sequence
was repeated twice more, so that the participant sampled in a
total of four natural-environment periods, each followed by an
(iterative) expositional interview. Theoretically, this procedure
could produce 4 × 6 = 24 natural-environment experience
samples. We (as is typical in DES) considered the ﬁrst day’s
samples unreliable and discarded them from subsequent analysis.
The remaining days often produce less than the maximum six
samples because the 1-h expositional interview runs out of
time before all samples are discussed. Undiscussed samples are
discarded. Hurlburt (2011a) has found that four such iterative
sampling day/expositional interviews typically result in skill
acquisition adequate for the remainder of this study; however,
more interviews could be scheduled if the expositional interviews
suggested it; one participant (#3) had one additional sampling
day to ensure we understood each other about what was or was
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not inner speaking. This procedure resulted in a variable number
of natural-environment samples, ranging from 13 to 22.
In the in-scanner DES sampling phase (Figure 1, middle
right), the participant (having been trained in DES in the natural
environment) entered the scanner for a 25-min session with
resting-state instructions “please relax, without falling asleep
and do keep your eyes open.” At four quasi-random times,
the participant received a DES beep through a headphone
(just as in the natural environment except the in-scanner
beep automatically terminated after 1.5 s, whereas the natural
environment beeps must be terminated by the participant).
Immediately after each beep, the participant jotted a few notes
about the ongoing experience on a clipboard positioned on
the lap (viewable through a mirror). Immediately after exiting
the scanner, the participant participated in a DES expositional
interview about the four randomly beeped experiences. This
in-scanner sequence (25-min fMRI scan/four beeps with jotted
notes/expositional interview) was repeated eight more times,
typically spread over ﬁve days, resulting in 9 × 4 = 36 random
samples of experience occurring in 9 × 25 = 225 min of fMRI
scanning for each participant.
In the ﬁnal/post DES phase (Figure 1, upper right), the
participant entered the scanner for another structural scan
and a ﬁnal 5-min standard resting-state scan using the same
instructions and procedures as in the ﬁrst 5-min resting state
scan. The participant then ﬁlled out the ReSQ questionnaire
under supervision of a psychologist and then was candidly
debriefed.
DES Quantitative Analysis
RTH and at least one additional person present at the interview
independently judged whether each of the 5FP was present at
each sample; discrepancies were resolved by discussion.
Scanning Procedure
Images were collected on a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany)
using a 32-channel radio frequency head coil. Structural
images were obtained using a three-dimensional T1-
weighted magnetization-prepared gradient-echo sequence
(MPRAGE) based on the ADNI protocol1 (repetition time
[TR] = 2500 ms; echo time [TE] = 4.77 ms; TI = 1100 ms,
acquisition matrix = 256 × 256 × 176, ﬂip angle = 7◦;
1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm voxel size). Functional images
were collected using a T2*-weighted echo planar imaging
(EPI) sequence sensitive to blood oxygen level dependent
(BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, image
matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 216 mm, ﬂip angle = 80◦, voxel
size 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm, 36 axial slices).
Resting State fMRI Analysis
The ﬁrst 10 volumes were discarded to allow the magnetisation
to approach a dynamic equilibrium and for the participants to
get used to the scanner noise. Part of the data pre-processing,
including slice timing, head motion correction (a least squares
1www.adni-info.org
approach and a six-parameter spatial transformation) and spatial
normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)
template (resampling voxel size of 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm),
were conducted using the SPM5 and Data Processing Assistant
for Resting-State fMRI (DPARSF, Chao-Gan and Yu-Feng,
2010). A spatial ﬁlter of 4 mm FWHM (full-width at
half maximum) was used. Participants showing head motion
above 3.0 mm of maximal translation (in any direction of
x, y, or z) or 1.0◦ of maximal rotation throughout the
course of scanning would have been excluded; this was not
necessary.
After pre-processing, linear trends were removed. Then the
fMRI data were temporally band-pass ﬁltered (0.01–0.08 Hz)
to reduce the very low-frequency drift and high-frequency
respiratory and cardiac noise (Biswal et al., 1995). Amplitude
of low frequency ﬂuctuations (ALFFs) analysis (Yang et al.,
2007; Zang et al., 2007) was performed using DPARSF (Chao-
Gan and Yu-Feng, 2010). We chose ALFF analysis since it is
a commonly used metric with high test-retest reliability (Zuo
and Xing, 2014). The time series for each voxel was transformed
to the frequency domain using fast Fourier transform (FFT),
and the power spectrum was obtained. Because the power of a
given frequency is proportional to the square of the amplitude
of this frequency component in the original time series in the
time domain, the power spectrum obtained by FFT was square
rooted and then averaged across 0.01–0.08 Hz at each voxel.
This averaged square root is the ALFF (Zang et al., 2007). The
ALFF of each voxel was divided by the individual global mean
of ALFF within a brain-mask, which was obtained by removing
the tissues outside the brain using software MRIcro (by Chris
Rorden2). A height threshold of p < 0.001 was applied to the
t maps.
We performed the same ALFF analysis on the fMRI data
acquired during the extended-duration resting-state sessions
except that we removed the images between the onset of the
DES beep and 2 min thereafter to exclude activity elicited by
tone presentation and the subsequent motor activation while the
subjects were jotting down notes. However, we also conducted
the ALFF analysis on all extended-duration resting state data,
including the 2 min after each beep.
Results
Characterization of Participants
Table 3 shows the percentages of each of the ﬁve frequent
phenomena (5FP) that had been described by Heavey and
Hurlburt (2008). These percentages are shown for each
participant, divided into pairs of columns for the natural
environment sampling and the in-scanner resting state sampling.
We begin by considering the natural environment.
Characteristics of Our Participants in their Natural
Environments
The study design called for each participant to undergo 4 days
[or more if the interviews called for it; one participant (#3)
2https://www.nitrc.org/projects/mricron
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TABLE 3 | Natural environment and in-scanner resting-state inner experience characteristics (5FPa percentagesb) for each participant.
Inner speaking Inner seeing Unsymbolized thinking Sensory awareness Feelings
Participant Nat.
env.
Scanner
rest. st.
Nat.
env.
Scanner
rest. st.
Nat.
env.
Scanner
rest. st.
Nat.
env.
Scanner
rest. st.
Nat.
env.
Scanner
rest. st.
1 (n = 13c ) 8 17 85 19 0 8 85 75 23 3
2 (n = 16) 13 22 0 22 6 3 94 75 13 3
3 (n = 22) 23 53 0 25 5 17 68 47 14 3
4 (n = 18) 39 39 6 42 11 33 6 19 72 22
5 (n = 12) 8 14 33 67 25 39 75 78 25 11
Mean 18.2 29.0 24.8 35.0 9.4 20.0 65.6 58.8 29.4 8.4
χ2 (df = 4) 6.99 19.09 47.54 24.57 6.02 22.01 35.56 38.18 21.00 13.82
p (for χ2 ) 0.13 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.20 0.001 0.000001 0.000001 0.001 0.01
r (df = 3) 0.73d −0.09 0.84 0.93 0.95
a5FP = “five frequent phenomena” as discussed by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). bPercentages do not add to 100 because experiences can have more than one
characteristic. cNumber of natural environment samples. Each participant had 36 in-scanner samples. dPearson r between Nat. env. and Scanner rest. st. across
participants.
had ﬁve natural environment days] of DES sampling in their
natural environments, for a potential maximum of 18 samples
(24 for participant #3) after discarding the ﬁrst day. The ﬁrst
column of Table 3 shows (in parenthesis) the number of natural
environment samples we actually obtained for each participant
after discarding the ﬁrst day. The number of natural environment
samples varied from participant to participant because training is
individualized.
The remaining columns of Table 3 show the percentages of
each of the 5FP for each participant. For example, in the natural
environment, participant #1 had 1 instance of inner speaking
out of his 13 natural environment samples, so the upper left cell
shows 100(1/13) = 8%.
The Table 3 row labeled “Mean” shows that, on average,
sensory awareness was our participants’ most frequently
occurring phenomenon in the natural environment (65.6%; we
consider in-scanner percentages below). Our participants
thus had more frequent sensory awareness than might
be expected from Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) stratiﬁed
natural environment sample, where only 22% of samples
involved sensory awareness. Inner speaking (18.2%), inner
seeing (24.8%), and feelings (29.4%) each occurred in the
natural environment at about the same frequency found
by Heavey and Hurlburt (26, 34, and 26%, respectively).
Unsymbolized thinking occurred at a somewhat lower frequency
in the natural environment than might be expected from
Heavey and Hurlburt (9.4% instead of Heavey and Hurlburt’s
22%).
Our Participants Differ from each other in their
Natural Environments
Now we ask whether our participants diﬀer from each
other on the 5FP (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008, had reported
large individual diﬀerences in 5FP characteristics). This is an
exploratory study, so we conducted a separate examination of
each of the 5FP characteristics. We discovered, for example, that
our ﬁve participants had very diﬀerent percentages of sensory
awareness when sampled in the natural environment (χ2 = 35.56,
p = 0.000001, df = 4). Similar analyses for the other four 5FP
phenomena revealed substantial individual diﬀerences for inner
seeing and for feelings; the inner speaking and unsymbolized
thinking diﬀerences were smaller. Some individual diﬀerences
among our participants are large: for example, the natural-
environment frequency of sensory awareness ranged from 6%
(for participant #4) to 94% (for participant #2); the frequency
of inner seeing ranged from 0% (for participants #2 and #3) to
85% (for participant #1), and so on. We performed subsequent
analyses in a variety of ways, always with the same results. For
example, participant 1 is left handed; if we exclude him from the
data, we similarly conclude that the remaining four right-handed
people are diﬀerent from each other in the same ways as all ﬁve
are diﬀerent.
Our Participants Differ from each other in the
In-Scanner Resting State Sessions
We now consider the in-scanner resting state percentages
shown in Table 3, asking whether our participants diﬀered
from each other in the scanner resting state. We performed
the same chi-squared analyses as just discussed, ﬁnding that
participants in the scanner diﬀered greatly from one another
on the frequencies of all ﬁve of the 5FP phenomena. We
conclude that our participants’ inner experiences are diﬀerent
from each other in the resting state. These diﬀerences are large:
for example, the resting state frequency of sensory awareness
ranged from 19% (for participant #4) to 78% (for participant
#5); the frequency of inner seeing ranged from 19% (for
participant #1) to 67% (for participant #5), and so on. We
again performed subsequent analyses in a variety of ways, always
with the same results. These results were similar to and more
striking than the natural environment diﬀerences (probably
because the natural environments themselves diﬀered greatly
from one participant to the next, and because the iterative
nature of DES makes early sampling days (which, in this
study, were all natural environment samplings) results relatively
unreliable compared to later sampling days (which were all in the
scanner).
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Our Participants’ Experiences in the Resting State
Sessions are Broadly Similar to their Experiences in
the Natural Environment
We now turn to consider whether a participant’s in-scanner
resting state percentages shown in Table 3 are similar to
that participant’s percentages in their natural environments.
We display an exploratory/descriptive Pearson correlation
for each of the 5FP across participants (df = 3) in the
last row of Table 3; these correlations are all very high
except for inner seeing, which is approximately zero. The
high correlations between in-scanner resting state and natural
environment does not imply that experience frequency is the
same in the scanner and the natural environment. It implies
that participants who had a relatively high frequency of a
particular characteristic in the natural environment also have
a relatively high frequency in the scanner. For example, there
were, overall, fewer feelings in the scanner (8.4%) than in
the natural environment (29.4%), but the participants who
had the most feelings in the natural environment (#4 and
5) also had the most feelings in the scanner. The same, but
opposite direction, is true for unsymbolized thinking: there was
more unsymbolized thinking in the scanner (20.0%) than in
the natural environment (9.4%), but the participants who had
the most unsymbolized thinking in the natural environment
(#4 and 5) also had the most unsymbolized thinking in the
scanner.
The distributions of experiential percentages are sometimes
very skewed, which may inﬂate a Pearson correlation, so we
conducted the same analyses using Spearman rank correlations,
which are not aﬀected by skew. The Spearman correlations (0.87,
−0.05, 0.70, 0.67, and 0.89, respectively) are very similar to
the Pearson correlations shown in the bottom row of Table 3,
suggesting that the correlations between natural environment
and resting state phenomena were not due to the extremity of the
values.
Thus our data suggest that for these participants, inner
experience in the resting state is quite strongly related to inner
experience in the natural environment except for the case of
inner seeing. We re-emphasize the exploratory nature of these
correlations given the small sample size.
Are Extended-Duration Resting State Sessions
Experientially Similar to Typical Resting State
Sessions?
Next we ask whether our extended-duration resting state sessions
are, broadly speaking, similar to typical (5- or 10-min) resting-
state sessions. Our resting state sessions were extended in two
ways: there were multiple sessions (nine) rather than the more
typical one, and each session had a long duration (25 min) rather
than the more typical 5 or 10 min; therefore we must explore
the potential impact of each of those two kinds of extended
duration.
There was Little Drift Across the Multiple Resting
State Sessions
First, we investigate whether the 5FP experiential frequencies
altered or drifted across this study’s multiple (nine) resting state
sessions. Table 4 shows the percentage of samples in each 5FP
category, aggregated across participants, displayed by session
number. There were four samples for each of the ﬁve participants
in each session, thus 4 × 5 = 20 samples per session. Across
all participants in the ﬁrst session, there were, for example, four
instances of inner speaking, so 4/20 = 20% is displayed in the
upper left (session 1/inner speaking) cell of Table 4. As shown
in the middle panel of Table 4, a chi-squared test of proportions
suggests that our participants’ frequency of inner speaking was
independent of session (χ2 = 7.68, p = 0.47, df = 8). The results
are similar for the remaining four 5FP characteristics, as shown in
the “All sessions χ2(df = 8)” rows of Table 4. These χ2 statistics
are all very small (and the corresponding p values large), far from
indicating any systematic diﬀerences, except for feelings, where
χ2 = 20.95 (p = 0.01).
We also asked whether there was a consistent trend
across sessions by computing an exploratory/descriptive Pearson
correlation between the percentage and the session number; the
“r (df = 7)” row of Table 4 shows that those correlations are
quite small. The strongest correlation (0.56) was for inner seeing,
indicating that inner seeing increased in frequency across scanner
sessions.
The ﬁrst of the nine resting state sessions is arguably the
session most similar to a typical one-shot resting state study.
As shown in the bottom panel of Table 4, we asked whether
the 5FP characteristics in the ﬁrst 25-min resting state session
diﬀered from the 5FP characteristics in the remaining eight
25-min resting state sessions. There were no large diﬀerences,
although there was somewhat more unsymbolized thinking in the
ﬁrst session.
TABLE 4 | Inner experience characteristics (5FP percentagesa) aggregated
across participants by scanner resting-state session.
Session Inner
speaking
Inner
seeing
Unsymbolized
thinking
Sensory
awareness
Feelings
1 20 25 40 50 5
2 30 20 15 40 5
3 45 40 15 70 0
4 40 45 5 75 15
5 15 20 25 70 0
6 25 40 20 65 15
7 35 45 20 60 0
8 30 35 25 60 30
9 20 45 15 40 5
Mean 28.89 35.00 20.00 58.89 8.33
All
sessions
χ2 (df = 8) 7.68 7.91 9.38 11.06 20.95
p (for χ2 ) 0.47 0.44 0.31 0.20 0.01
r (df = 7) −0.16 0.56 −0.21 −0.03 0.34
1st
session
χ2 (df = 1) 0.87 0.99 5.63 0.73 0.33
p (for χ2 ) 0.35 0.32 0.02 0.39 0.57
aPercentages do not add to 100 because experiences can have more than one
characteristic.
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We performed these χ2 analyses in several diﬀerent ways, all
discovering approximately the same level of independence. For
example, we also asked whether the last session diﬀered from the
ﬁrst eight; and whether the ﬁrst four sessions diﬀered from the
last four. None of these tests (not reported here) showed large
diﬀerences.
Taken together, these results indicate that there were not large
or systematic shifts in experience across the nine resting state
scanner sessions.
There was Little Drift within the Long Duration
Resting State Sessions
Second, we investigate whether our participants’ 5FP experiential
frequencies altered or drifted within each of this study’s long
duration (25-min) resting state sessions. Table 5 shows the
aggregation of samples from the ﬁrst half of each session and
those from the second half. For example, we asked whether those
aggregates diﬀered for inner speaking and found that there was
somewhat more inner speaking in the ﬁrst half of sessions (37%
vs. 21%;χ2 = 5.3, p= 0.02, df = 1). The other 5FP characteristics
had no large diﬀerences, as shown in the bottom two rows of
Table 5.
Furthermore, we performed all the analyses described for
Tables 2 and 3 within each participant singly, ﬁnding similar
levels of independence within participants. The p-values for
individual participants when performing the kind of analysis
shown in Table 4 are 0.71, 0.56, 0.47, 0.21, and 0.83. Similarly, the
individual participant p values comparable to the Table 5 analysis
were 0.68, 0.54, 0.77, 0.02, and 0.98. There is one small p value
in those studies: participant #4 can be characterized as having
less inner speaking and more inner seeing aggregated across the
second halves of all sessions. That is, however, the only relatively
large frequency diﬀerence.
Thus our data suggest that there are not large or systematic
shifts in experience within the nine resting state scanner sessions.
Are Extended-Duration Resting State Sessions
Neurophysiologically Similar to Typical Resting
State Sessions?
We have explored whether there were experiential characteristics
that would lead us to suspect that our extended-duration resting
state sessions were substantially diﬀerent from typical resting
state sessions, and concluded that there were not. Now we ask
whether there were neurophysiological characteristics that would
TABLE 5 | Inner experience characteristics (5FP percentagesa) in first half
or second half of scanner sessions.
Session part Inner
speaking
Inner
seeing
Unsymbolized
thinking
Sensory
awareness
Feelings
First half 37 31 18 60 6
Second half 21 39 22 58 11
χ2 (df = 1) 5.30 1.20 0.56 0.09 1.82
p 0.02 0.27 0.46 0.76 0.18
aPercentages do not add to 100 because experiences can have more than one
characteristic.
suggest a diﬀerence between extended-duration resting state
sessions and typical resting state sessions. The small sample size
makes customary statistical analysis of fMRI data unsatisfactory,
but we can examine in broad strokes whether the brain activity
we recorded is similar to the default mode brain activity generally
understood to be ongoing in typical resting state scanner studies.
As illustrated above in Figure 1, our design had a standard 5-min
resting state scan in the introduction/pre-DES resting state phase
and another standard 5-min resting state scan in the ﬁnal/post-
DES phase. Our resting state sessions in the in-scanner DES
sampling phase used typical resting state instructions except for
the times participants spent jotting down notes in response to
the DES random beeps. As shown in Figure 2, we computed
ALFF from the data of each participant for each of the three
phases, arbitrarily excluding 2 min beginning with the onset of
each beep in the in-scanner DES sampling phase to exclude brain
activity related to the beep and subsequent motor activity. In
all 15 plots we ﬁnd higher ALFF values in the regions typically
activated in resting state studies, namely in superior and inferior
anterior medial frontal regions, lower precuneus, and posterior
lateral parietal cortex. On the possibility that excising the 2 min
following each beep creates an artifact, we computed the same 15
plots including the 2 min after each beep in the analysis; those
plots are nearly identical to those displayed in Figure 2 (and are
available from the authors).
Phenomena in the Resting State
We inquire now about the phenomena that DES apprehended
during the extended-duration resting state scanner sessions. We
begin by recalling one of the main ﬁndings of Table 3 above:
there are great individual diﬀerences in people’s resting state
experience. The resting state frequency of inner speaking ranged
from 17 to 53%; inner seeing ranged from 19 to 67%; sensory
awareness ranged from 19 to 78%. Thus our data suggest that
there is no single kind of resting state phenomenology.
To give a glimpse into the kinds of experience that are found
in the resting state, we provide a few typical examples, one from
each participant. The entire set of experiences is available from
the authors.
1. (Jack, participant 1, sample 8.3) Jack is rubbing with his
thumb the fabric that holds the writing board, and he feels the
snagging of the fabric on his thumb. This is more a sense in
his thumb than of the fabric. He is involved with determining
whether this is wool or synthetic, but that is a part of the
sensation, not a cognitive act. (Sensory awareness).
2. (Lara, participant 2, sample 7.7) Lara is looking at the edges
of the scanner mirror—left bottom corner, and sees two of
them, layering. Simultaneously she is hearing herself say, to
no one in particular, “I really want to talk to you.” The voice
is recognized to be her own, expressed in her own natural
way; however, the vocal characteristics are not of her own
voice but of some female voice that she doesn’t recognize.
The wrongness of the vocal characteristics was noted only
retrospectively—at the moment of the beep, experientially,
Lara simply hears herself talking. She knows who the “you” is
in this sentence, but the sentence is not directed to that person.
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FIGURE 2 | Amplitude of low frequency fluctuation (ALFF) maps for each participant in the three conditions.
She is also seeing her hands. (Sensory awareness and inner
hearing with idiosyncratic characteristics).
3. (Otto, participant 3, sample 5.5) Otto is saying in inner speech
“I just turned 30.” He doesn’t know why he is saying that or to
whom, but he is clear that that is what he is experiencing and
that he is emphasizing the word “turned.” (Inner speaking).
4. (Susan, participant 4, sample 6.6) Susan innerly sees the
actress Sigourney Weaver in a cryogenic tank from the movie
Alien. She sees Sigourney’s face from above, below the glass
window of the tank—the rest of Sigourney’s body is vaguely
or blurrily present. Mostly Susan is searching for the word
used in the movie: cryogenic chamber, cryogenic tank, etc.,
waiting for the right word to appear. This is primarily a
state of suspended animation, waiting for the word—she does
not see or hear pieces of words, etc. (Inner seeing and an
uncategorized experience of cognition).
5. (Jane, participant 5, sample 5.8) Jane is aware of the ﬁdgetiness
of her upper trunk, arms, and eyes; they want to move. She
is also simultaneously looking at the gray plastic piece of
the scanner, noticing especially the dark grayness of it. (Two
separate, simultaneous sensory awarenesses).
It can be seen from these examples (and from the entire
data set) that resting state experience is active and involved. The
resting state is not a state of phenomenological rest or suspension,
but is typically engaged and explicit. It is sometimes simple but is
often complex and multilayered. Sensory awareness can involve
any of the senses, can be actual or imaginary, and can be tied to
the environment or distant from it. Inner speaking can be self-
directed, other directed, or neither; can be in one’s own voice
or someone else’s; can be meaningful or relatively meaningless.
Similar characterizations of the diversity of experience can be
made within inner seeing and feelings.
Comparing Questionnaire and DES Sampling
We have seen that there were large individual diﬀerences in
DES-sampled inner experience but small diﬀerences in inner
experience across the resting state sessions and within sessions.
We now inquire about the adequacy of retrospective accounts
of resting state experience. Recall that this study began with
a typical 5-min resting state study, immediately followed by
the participant’s ﬁlling out the ReSQ (Delamillieure et al.,
2010), a questionnaire designed to characterize inner experiences
in the scanner. We now compare the ReSQ (retrospective
questionnaire) results with the 5FP (as sampled by DES) results.
The ReSQ is not aimed directly at the 5FP, but two of the ReSQ
items seem directly comparable and one is indirectly comparable.
The ReSQ presents visual-analog scales which ask participants
to rate the resting-state frequency of “visual mental imagery,”
which can be taken to be comparable to 5FP inner seeing, and
“inner language,” which can be taken to be comparable to 5FP
inner speaking. Additionally, the ReSQ asks participants to rate
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“somatosensory awareness,” which can be taken to be comparable
to a subset of the 5FP sensory awareness. Sensory awareness
can be visual, auditory, and so on, as well as bodily, so we split
the 5FP sensory awareness into bodily sensory awareness and
other sensory awareness, and compared the ReSQ somatosensory
awareness to bodily sensory awareness. Then we could compare
the three ReSQ characterizations to the sampling frequencies.
The ReSQ does not inquire about anything related to the two
remaining 5FP (unsymbolized thinking or feelings).
Table 6 presents the ReSQ percentages side by side with
the DES (sampling) percentages for the three comparable
characteristics for each participant. For example, participant #1
used the visual analog scales of the ReSQ to report that he
had spent 40% of his 5-min resting-state time engaged in inner
language. His DES sampling showed that 17% of his 36 DES
in-scanner samples involved inner speaking.
The “Max discrepancy” row of Table 6 shows the largest
diﬀerence between a participant’s ReSQ percentage and DES
percentage. It can be seen that some of these discrepancies are
very large; for example, the maximum discrepancy for inner
speaking (Participant 5’s) was 81% (her estimate on the ReSQwas
95% minus her 14% obtained by DES).
After participating in 13 DES sampling periods and their 13
expositional interviews, each participant again underwent (in
the Final/post-DES phase) a standard 5-min resting state scan,
immediately followed by another administration of the ReSQ.
The second ReSQ maximum discrepancies were substantially
smaller than the original ReSQ maximum discrepancies (29.5,
20.5, and 23.5, respectively).
High Fidelity in a Single Case: Jane’s Inner
Experience
We have established that, at least for this small sample, people’s
retrospective or general characterizations of their resting state
experience are not to be accepted as faithful accounts of actual
experience while in the scanner. We have not, however, described
that actual experience. We now provide a glimpse into the
experience of one participant, described in as high ﬁdelity as we
can muster.
We choose to describe participant #5, Jane, because she
exempliﬁes those (perhaps a majority) who are substantially
mistaken about their own inner experience. Jane believed, prior
TABLE 6 | Resting-State Questionnaire (first administration) percentages
compared to DES sampling percentages.
Participant Inner speaking Inner seeing Bodily sensory
awareness
ReSQ DES ReSQ DES ReSQ DES
1 40 17 14 19 38.5 39
2 40.5 22 57.5 22 31.5 36
3 69 53 11 25 78.5 33
4 20 39 60 42 20 8
5 95 14 85 67 42 11
Max discrepancy 81.0 35.5 45.5
to participation, that she talked to herself nearly all the time
(as reﬂected by her self report, by a 90% inner speech rating
on a questionnaire not reported here, and by her ReSQ inner
speech rating of 95%); however, sampling revealed that she talks
to herself only rarely. In the natural environment she had only
one example of inner speaking:
(Jane sample 3.4) Jane was in the U-Bahn, sitting on a bench
waiting for a train. She is hearing the sound of kids talking—
lots of them; she hears their chatter—loud and clear—how they
sound, not what they are saying. She is also writing “I cannot see”
and saying those words in inner speech, but more attending to the
writing.
The inner speaking here is only the third most prominent
feature of her experience (after hearing the chatter and attending
to the writing).
In the scanner, there was one straightforward example of Jane’s
inner speaking:
(Jane sample 5.5) Jane is innerly asking her friend Sharon where
she lives in Berlin. Jane is asking this in Swedish (which is both her
native tongue and Sharon’s) at a pace that she described as similar
to ordinary speaking in that language. Simultaneously Jane, whose
eyes are closed, is seeing ambiguous dark shapes in black, yellow,
and gold. The two experiences (speaking and seeing colors) are
approximately equal in signiﬁcance/attention.
We counted two samples as containing inner speaking where
the speech might not be considered “I thought in words” by most
people:
(Jane sample 8.2) Jane is looking at the writing tablet in the mirror
and mainly attending to its dark, rectangular shape, which takes
upmost of themirror. She can see the piece of paper on it, which is
small. The white paper stands out against the dark background. At
the moment of the beep she is also innerly saying “Oh yeah!” and
thinking that she should email the kindergarten that she had been
intending to volunteer at. The thought about the kindergarten is
not worded or accompanied by any pictures.
“Oh yeah” was clearly innerly spoken, so we counted it as inner
speaking, but the thought was about kindergarten volunteering,
and “Oh yeah” was more an accompanying ejaculation (possibly
expressing a motivational function of inner speech; McCarthy-
Jones and Fernyhough, 2011).
(Jane sample 7.6) Two things are ongoing simultaneously: (1) Jane
is seeing the half-moon shape at the top of the scanner mirror.
She sees everything that is out there – the people, the tops of
computers, etc., particularly noticing the blue/black striped shirt
of the person who is walking back and forth. Everything is clear;
the striped shirt is more central and more detailed. (2) Jane is
imagining herself reading a story aloud to kids. She is growling like
a wolf or a bear, and she feels her eyebrows rising for eﬀect, and
she feels her ﬁngers straightening out and expanding for terriﬁc
eﬀect (in reality, there is no bodily movement). There is a sense
of the kids present, but not particular kids (probably kids that she
knows).
The growling was oral, so we (liberally) counted it as inner
speaking.
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There was one sample where inner speaking may have been
ongoing:
(Jane sample 6.6) Jane is thinking that her hair was a mess and
is simultaneously innerly seeing herself in the mirror in her
bathroom at home, a remembering of what she had seen earlier.
The thinking portion: she is thinking that her hair is a mess (even
though she doesn’t see her hair very completely in the mirror); the
thinking involves some hints of words that might be like “Ohman
my hair is a mess.” There were not fully formed words, although
neither were words completely absent. The seeing portion: the
seeing of herself in themirror includes the seeing of the bathroom,
seen through her own eyes, including the mirror, the bright light,
the sink, the toilet, and part of her body. There is no speciﬁc focus
to the image. The thought (of hair being a mess) was the main
focus, about 60/40.
There were two samples which involved Jane’s voice being
innerly heard (rather than spoken) as an aspect of a recollection.
Here is one:
(Jane sample 5.6) Jane is imaginarily replaying a conversation she
had with her friend Sharon. Jane innerly sees the ﬂoor, sees Sharon
in her inner peripheral vision, and hears herself say “If you look at
me I don’t look Swedish.” Mostly Jane is paying attention to her
ownwords, which she hears (note that in the original conversation
she had spoken the words, but now she hears them, not speaks
them).
There were two samples where words were present but which
had no experienced meaning. Here’s one:
(Jane sample 7.1) Jane innerly hears herself saying “thinks about
what used to be there,” said in her own voice, as clear as hearing
someone else externally speaking. She can’t control the speech and
it doesn’t present itself as meaningful speech (that is, she doesn’t
know who thinks, where there is, or what used to be there). As an
equal part of her experience (50:50) Jane simultaneously innerly
sees a long piece of something pale and white; simultaneously she
somehow knows it to be a log, even though it doesn’t look like
a log. That is, she does not see a log. The words she can hear
are understood to be related to the image, but she doesn’t know
why/how.
If one counts all those samples which contain the experience
of words or hints of words—frank inner speech, inchoate inner
speech, inner hearing, and so on—the frequency of Jane’s words
is 14% in the natural environment and 25% in the scanner,
far smaller than her prior-to-sampling self-understanding (90 or
95%). Part of the discrepancy might be accounted for by the fact
that Jane frequently engaged in unsymbolized thinking (Hurlburt
and Akhter (2008a)): the direct, unambiguous experience of
thinking that is not accompanied by words, images, or other
symbols (25% in the natural environment and 39% in the
scanner). Here, are two examples from the scanner:
(Jane sample 5.1) Jane is wondering whether it is possible to 100%
do two things at once (a reference to something RTH had said a
few days before). There are no words or symbols, even though she
is quite speciﬁc about the “100%” part and the “at once” part, etc.
She is simultaneously also slightly attending to the scanner sound.
(Jane sample 8.7) Jane’s eyes have closed in a blink and she sees a
negative image of the half-moon scanner scene: what is actually
white she sees dark, and what is actually dark she sees light pale
yellow. This seeing starts where the actual scene exists and then
ﬂoats downward. Simultaneously she is thinking a little bit about
Master’s programs: how courses are selected, how do you decide
what thesis to write, how do you write it, etc. This is all without
words or images and are all aspects of one thinking.
Hurlburt and Akhter (2008a) reported that many people who
have frequent unsymbolized thinking initially believe that such
thinking is impossible and (mistakenly) understand themselves
to be thinking in words.
Furthermore, Jane’s most frequent kind of experience was
sensory awareness (75% in the natural environment and 78% in
the scanner). We have given several examples above (samples 3.4,
5.5, 5.8, 7.1, 7.6, and 8.2). Here is another (which includes three
simultaneous sensory awarenesses):
(Jane sample 8.8) Jane is seeing the knuckles on her left hand,
especially the silvery blue shades of her knuckles caused by the
blue light. Simultaneously she hears the incredibly loud noise of
the scanner, primarily in her right ear, and she feels her upper
body vibrate in sync with that noise.
Hurlburt et al. (2009) reported that many people who
have frequent sensory awareness initially (mistakenly) believe
that such experience is explicitly cognitive, and (mistakenly)
understand themselves to be thinking in words. For example,
it is likely that, before sampling, had Jane had the experience
described in sample 8.8, she would have (mistakenly) believed
that she was saying to herself that the silvery blue shade of her
knuckles was interesting.
Over the course of sampling, Jane came to the realization that
she frequently had sensory experiences without cognitive overlay
and that she frequently had thoughts that did not involve words
(what we call unsymbolized thinking). Perhaps as a result, when
she characterized her frequency of verbal thinking on the second
(end of sampling) administration of the ReSQ, she estimated her
resting-state inner speech percentage to be 22.5%, much lower
than her ﬁrst ReSQ estimate of 95%.
Discussion
We have noted the importance of exploring the experiential
phenomena of the resting state, an undertaking that has not been
accomplished heretofore because of methodological challenges.
We address those challenges using DES, a technique designed
to explore experience in high ﬁdelity, in an extended duration
resting state fMRI study that involved multiple (nine) sessions,
each of long duration (25 min), for a total of 225 min in the
scanner rather than the more usual 5 or 10 min.
Because of the intensity of the eﬀort (for each participant,
11 scanner sessions and 13 DES expositional interviews, each
with two or more highly skilled interviewers), we used in this
exploratory study only ﬁve participants. This study is therefore
best considered a small ﬁrst step in an important direction
rather than a deﬁnitive investigation. All the results that we have
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reported above and will discuss below must be understood in the
context of weighing the risks of small-n descriptive studies against
their beneﬁts (Hurlburt, 2011a, Chap. 21). The results suggest
that the neurophysiological sophistication of the scanner can be
proﬁtably combined with the phenomenological sophistication of
DES, and that opens substantial possibilities for issues that are
central to neuroscience and psychology in general.
Our results indicate that there were not large or systematic
shifts in experience across the multiple (nine) sessions or
within the long-duration (25 min) sessions. Furthermore, our
brain activation results showed that the ALFF patterns in
each participant in each of the three phases (the initial 5-min
resting state session, the concatenated extended-duration resting
state sessions, and the ﬁnal 5-min resting state session) all
showed activation in superior and inferior anterior medial frontal
regions, lower precuneus and posterior lateral parietal cortex
as would be expected from typical resting state studies. Taken
together, these results suggest that our extended-duration resting
state sessions were experientially and neurophysiologically
broadly similar to typical resting-state sessions.
We found substantial individual diﬀerences in resting-
state experience across our participants. For example, the
resting-state frequency of sensory awareness ranged from
19 to 78%; inner seeing ranged from 19 to 67%; inner
speaking ranged from 14 to 53%; and so on. We found
similar wide ranges in the natural environment, as did
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). It therefore seems that our ﬁve
participants were, in broad strokes, similar to what might
be expected in a sample of volunteers for psychological or
neuropsychological studies. We note that the import of this
ﬁnding is not diminished by the small sample size: we have
documented substantial experiential diﬀerences, calling into
question the frequently held assumption of universal experiential
characteristics.
With the exception of inner seeing, we found a substantial
relationship between a person’s experiential frequencies in the
natural environment and that person’s in-scanner resting state.
At least as measured by the 5FP, our participants apparently
engaged in approximately the same forms of experience in the
scanner as they do in their own everyday environments—those
who have frequent sensory awareness in the natural environment
also have frequent sensory awareness in the scanner, and so
on. This ﬁnding suggests that the term “resting state” may have
two unfortunate connotations: that people are psychologically at
rest and that there is one state in which they ﬁnd themselves.
Our data suggest that the default mode network (DMN) may
be activated because people are engaging in their usual kinds
of spontaneous, everyday experience in the scanner, the same
kind of experience they would engage in if they were actively
participating in their own wide-ranging everyday undertakings.
That is, the DMN may be active when people experientially
do what they usually do (whether resting or not), and is
suppressed when the person is instructed by an experimenter to
do something foreign or unnatural to that individual. Perhaps
scientists characterizing their participants when not engaged in
tasks should refer to “unconstrained activity” rather than to the
“resting state.”
We emphasize the desirability of replication by others with
larger sample sizes. The present study is unique in that it gathers
data both in the natural environment and in the scanner, thus
aﬀording the ﬁrst opportunity to compare natural-environment
to in-scanner experience. We note the important caveat that
the natural environment data gathered here are experiential,
so it requires an extrapolation to infer that brain activation,
like experience, is similar in the natural environment and the
scanner.
As we saw in Table 1, researchers have provided a wide variety
of characterizations about phenomena in the resting state. Some
have noted the verbal nature of this experience (see Table 1 rows
1 and 2). The present study provided 5 × 36 = 180 glimpses
of experience in the resting state; of those, approximately 58
(32%) involved words of any kind, whether innerly spoken,
innerly heard or imagined in any other way. The determination
of whether a particular sample involves words is not perfectly
reliable, so some might say our 32% over-represents or under-
represents the frequency of words to some degree, but it is safe
to conclude that most of our participant’s sampled resting-state
experiences were not verbal.
Some researchers have characterized resting state experience
as involving planning (Table 1 rows 3 and 4). Of the
present study’s 180 glimpses, approximately 39 (22%) could
be said to involve planning when “planning” was deﬁned
in a very inclusive way. Here again, the determination of
whether planning was part of a particular sample is far from
perfectly reliable, but it is safe to conclude that most of
our sampled experiences did not involve planning for the
future.
Some researchers have characterized resting state experience
as involving enhanced attention (Table 1 rows 5 and 6). Our
participants did indeed have frequent speciﬁc awareness of inner
or external stimuli. However, their sensory awarenesses were
not enhanced or increased: our participants had very frequent
speciﬁc and engrossing sensory awareness in their own natural
environments—in fact, the frequency of such experience was
slightly higher in the natural environment (65.6%) than in the
scanner (58.8%). Such naturally occurring sensory awarenesses
are very frequently overlooked by people who engage in such
phenomena frequently (Hurlburt et al., 2009).
Some researchers have characterized resting state experience
as involving an internal monitoring (Table 1 rows 7, 8, and 9).
However, others have held that it involves an external monitoring
(Table 1 row 5), whereas yet others have held that it is an
alternation of internal with external (Table 1 row 6). Our results
suggest that actual experience is sometimes inwardly directed,
sometimes externally directed, and sometimes neither, with no
direction overwhelmingly predominant.
Some researchers have characterized resting state experience
in ways that we ﬁnd diﬃcult to parse in experiential terms
(Table 1 rows 10 and 11). We invite them to peruse our glimpses
(all available from us) and draw appropriate conclusions.
We now ask whether the questionnaires designed to
investigate resting-state phenomena can do so in high ﬁdelity.
The ReSQ asks participants to characterize their experience
into ﬁve categories (visual imagery, in inner language, in
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somatosensory awareness, in inner musical experience, and in
the mental manipulation of numbers) using instructions that
require “that the total score for the ﬁve types of activity
had to equal 100%” (Delamillieure et al., 2010, p. 566).
That instruction presupposes that categories are mutually
exclusive: that an experience is either, for example, inner
language or somatosensory awareness but not both. Our own
participants provide 24 examples (13%) where that mutual-
exclusive assumption is far from correct—our Lara (participant
2, sample 7.7) above is one such example (as is example 5, in
one respect). Here is another: Otto (sample 7.5) is reciting a
poem to himself (Goethe’s “Erlkönig”) and he is currently on the
third line (of four) of the seventh stanza (of eight). He is innerly
speaking the line “Mein Vater, mein Vater, jetzt faster mich an” in
a soft declarative voice. Simultaneously he is counting the stanza
on his left ﬁngers and the line within stanza on his right ﬁnger
(so he is holding his second ﬁnger left hand against the desk to
indicate seventh stanza and the third ﬁnger right hand against
the desk to indicate third line). He is more aware of his right
hand (apparently because it is about to advance to the fourth
line). Simultaneously he is actively trying not to hear the noise
of the scanner. That is, he is not merely automatically screening
out the noise (which he does successfully on other occasions). He
hears the noise but he is actively trying not to attend to it. We
conclude that the ReSQ presupposition that characteristics must
add to 100% is importantly misguided.
The two other questionnaires aimed at characterizing the
resting state (ARSQ, Diaz et al., 2013, and ARSQ 2.0, Diaz
et al., 2014; and the NYC-Q; Gorgolewski et al., 2014) also have
presuppositions that we believe substantially interfere with their
ability to ascertain with ﬁdelity the characteristics of experience.
For example, both inquire about thoughts. The ARSQ 2.0
instructions ask participants in an online study to sit quietly in
front of their computer screen for 5 min. At the conclusion of
the 5 min, a screen appears which reads, “The 5 min of rest
are over. Now several statements will follow regarding potential
feelings and thoughts you may have experienced during the
resting period. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with
each statement” (Diaz et al., 2014, p. 2). Statements such as “I
thought in words” and “I thought about myself” are to be rated on
a “ﬁve-point ordinal scale with the labels ‘Completely Disagree,’
‘Disagree,’ ‘Neither Agree nor Disagree,’ ‘Agree,’ and ‘Completely
Agree”’ (Diaz et al., 2013, pp. 2–3). The NYC-Q asks participants
to report on the content and form of their self-generated thoughts
using Likert scales for items that begin “I thought about” X
or “I thought of” X (Gorgolewski et al., 2014, p. 3). However,
careful DES interviewing reveals consistently that people use the
word “thinking” (or “thought”) in highly disparate ways, leading
Hurlburt and Heavey to conclude:
We take it as an axiom that when a DES participant says “I was
thinking . . .,” we know nothing whatever about the phenomena of
her inner experience. That claim may be highly counterintuitive,
because most people, when asked, do in fact deﬁne “thinking” as a
cognitive event and correctly discriminate between, for example,
“thinking” and “feeling” when observing one person solving a
math problem and another crying. Our claim is that when people
speak of the experience of others, the referent of thinking is some
cognitive process or event, but when they speak of themselves, the
referent of thinking is frequently not cognitive and is unspeciﬁed
and/or unspeciﬁable.
The word thinking is arguably the most problematic word
in the exploration of pristine experience (Hurlburt and Heavey,
2015, p. 151).
Despite the phenomenological ambiguity of the words
“thinking” and “thought,” most of the ARSQ items (18 out of
27) and all of the NYC-Q items inquire about thinking as if
participants would have a joint understanding about what is
being asked. Hurlburt (2011a) held that it requires iterative
training to help participants use experiential terminology in
consistent ways. For example, suppose that our Jane had had
an experience such as her sample 5.8 (ﬁdgetiness noticing the
dark grayness of the plastic piece) but had not undergone the
DES iterative training. Hurlburt (2011a) would suggest that Jane
would very likely have reported herself to have been thinking that
she wanted to move and thinking about the gray plastic piece,
rather than to have been engaged in sensory awarenesses of those
aspects of her environment.
It might be observed that the DES expositional interviews
are themselves retrospective, just like questionnaire reports: both
occurred following the participant’s exiting the scanner. However,
the DES expositional interviews are constrained by the notes
jotted down contemporaneously. One might then observe that
even those “contemporaneous” notes are actually retrospective—
the target experience was a few seconds prior to the note jotting.
This criticism holds that retrospection, no matter how short, so
disrupts experience that what seems like recollection is actually
a construction that is unrelated to whatever experience may have
been ongoing at themoment of the beep.We think that is unlikely
given our careful questioning of hundreds of people in sampling
situations, but we accept that it is possible. However, if that
possibility is taken seriously, then all ﬁrst-person reports should
be excluded from science, because all ﬁrst-person reports require
some sort of retrospection. Excluding all ﬁrst-person reports is
an entirely defensible (although we think misguided) scientiﬁc
strategy. This issue has been discussed at length in Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel (2007) and Hurlburt (2011a).
It might be observed that the natural environment training
performed in this study was more ineﬃcient—even accepting
that iterative training is necessary—than performing that iterative
training in the scanner, where experiences of exactly the sort
that are found in the scanner could be examined and clariﬁed.
Hurlburt (2011a) holds that training in a target environment is a
risky practice. One of the main objects of the iterative procedure
is to help participants overcome or bracket their presuppositions
about experience. That is always a diﬃcult thing to accomplish,
but it is made more diﬃcult the more closely tied the training is
to the target experiences. Furthermore, it would undermine the
conﬁdence one might have in the results. For example, suppose
that in the present study there had been no natural environment
training. Further suppose (as actually happened) that the study
discovered exceptionally high frequencies of sensory awareness.
In that case, the criticism could have been eﬀectively leveled that
the high frequency of sensory awareness was an artifact of the
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in-scanner training: the noise of the scanner would have been a
salient characteristic of the ﬁrst scanner session, and therefore
a large topic of conversation in the ﬁrst expositional interview.
The participant could have gleaned that the interviewer was
particularly interested in sensory awareness, and would therefore
have been more likely to report sensory awareness in subsequent
interviews. However, the study as designed diminishes that
criticism. Participants were introduced to sampling in their
natural environments, which were no more nor less sensorially
salient than usual. The ﬁrst expositional interviews were not
skewed by the experimental situation toward the sensory, and in
fact covered a wide range of topics and characteristics absolutely
unrelated to scanning features. On the basis of those interviews,
we discovered that our participants had sensory interests, but
we also conveyed by word and deed to our participants that we
were not particularly interested in sensory aspects. With that as
background, we think that whatever phenomena are discovered
in the in-scanner sampling are more believable.
It might be observed, following Ross and Nisbett (1991),
that the intensive, multiple interviews such as those we have
conducted run the risk of biasing the participant. That is indeed a
risk, but Hurlburt has written extensively (Hurlburt and Heavey,
2006; Hurlburt, 2011a) about the many ways DES manages that
risk. For one example, the DES procedure is “open-beginninged”
(Hurlburt, 2011a): the interviewer does not initially inquire about
any phenomenon that has been speciﬁed a priori (that is, DES
does not initially inquire about images, or about inner speech,
or about any other pre-deﬁned topic) but instead asks for a
description of whatever experience, if any, was ongoing at the
moment of the beep, and then follows up on the participant’s
response. Hurlburt (2007, pp. 285–289) has argued that Ross and
Nisbett’s own analysis shows that “opening up the channel factor”
mitigates the obedience risk, and Hurlburt has shown how DES
gives multiple and repeated channel-opening instructions:
For example, we explicitly and repeatedly told (DES participant)
Melanie that she could withdraw at any time; that saying “I don’t
know” or “I don’t remember” was a perfectly legitimate response,
that we valued her best eﬀort over any predetermined expectation;
that it was quite possible that things wouldn’t be clear and that
that was okay; that the task was perhaps impossible; that we would
learn as much or more from her inability to perform a task as
we would from her ability to perform it easily; that we much
preferred her unexaggerated candor to any attempt to ﬁgure out
what we wanted to hear; and so on. Not only did we say such
things repeatedly, but we meant them sincerely; and not only
did we mean them sincerely, I think Melanie recognized that
we meant them sincerely. Therefore, by Ross and Nisbett’s own
argument, we, I think, successfully undermined the channel eﬀect
and therefore should not expect large obedience eﬀects.
(Hurlburt, 2007, p. 288)
It might be asked whether the intensive training provided
in this study alters the participants so that their resting states
are no longer similar to untrained individuals. We do indeed
believe that participants become more skilled at apprehending
their experience, but for most participants, we think that does not
substantially alter the nature of their experience. Table 4 provides
a bit of support for that statement: there is not substantial
experiential drift across the sessions. Replication by multiple
methods is desirable.
Even if one accepts the ﬁdelity of the individual observations,
it might be observed that because of the small sample size (n= 5),
generalization to any population is risky. That is indeed true
(and we have tried to insert appropriate caveats to that eﬀect
throughout), but there are advantages and disadvantages to all
approaches in science including large sample size. We take as an
example the Diaz et al. (2014) brieﬂy described above, because it is
an exemplary study at the state of its art and one which appeared
recently in this journal.
Diaz et al. (2014) had a large sample (1444 participants) ﬁll
out the ARSQ or ARSQ 2.0 to investigate “mind-wandering
experiences,” including “verbal thought.” The disadvantage
of large n is that Diaz et al. (2014) cannot know what any
participant intended when endorsing Agree to any of the
ARSQ statements, for example, to “I thought in words.”
Participants might endorse Agree because they thought in
words frequently, or because they thought in words once
but recall it, or because they mistakenly believe themselves
to think in words even though they never actually thought
in words during the experiment. To sort through those
important diﬀerences requires an iterative method (Hurlburt,
2011a), which in turn requires multiple interviews and
multiple skilled interviewers, making large sample sizes
impossible.
Questionnaire responses can be validated in a variety of ways
(see Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015, for a review of inner
speech validation), and such validation is necessary to science.
However, Hurlburt (2011a, Chap. 21) argued in favor of a science
that values both validity-based and observation-based methods
and that recognizes the very diﬀerent constraints that operate in
each realm. Here, for example, we discovered that one of our ﬁve
participants, Jane, ﬁrmly believed herself (prior to participation)
to be a nearly-all-the-time inner speaker but was more likely a
nearly-none-of-the-time inner speaker. Does that imply that 20%
of people are hugely mistaken about their inner speech? Certainly
not—such a claim would indeed require a large n study. However,
it does show that some people (Hurlburt, 2011a, believes that Jane
is by no means exceptional) are hugely mistaken. Furthermore,
we have shown that a few samples from one person can provide
rich insight into the nature of verbal experience—that words
are sometimes spoken, sometimes heard, sometimes inchoate,
sometimes meaningless. That is a revealed phenomenological
richness that cannot possibly be obtained from questionnaires,
even from thousands of responses to “Please indicate the extent
to which you agree with ‘I thought in words’.” Such results
can be obtained only from idiographic, iterative examination of
individuals (Hurlburt, 2011a), and such depth of examination
and careful disentangling of language is possible only with small
numbers of participants.
This was a small study in terms of number of participants,
but a large study in terms of intensity [13 DES expositional
interviews, 11 scanner sessions (approximately 275 min) per
participant]. The results are provocative: they suggest that high
ﬁdelity descriptions of inner experience can be gathered in the
scanner; they suggest that there are large individual diﬀerences
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in inner experience in the scanner; they suggest that experience
in the resting state may be characterized as being unconstrained
activity. Clearly these results need to be replicated by larger
studies and by investigators unrelated to us, but if replicated,
they would make signiﬁcant contributions to scientists’ quest to
integrate information about experience and brain function in the
MRI scanner.
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